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Brazil is a land of contrasts; at the same time that it is emerging as a global 
economic power, it is also one of the most unequal countries in Latin America. 
When “Lula” Da Silva and his Workers’ Party (“PT”) won the 2002 election, they 
intended to pay a historical debt to the poor. Lula envisioned a country with 
inclusive growth, where redistribution and poverty reduction were seen as 
prerequisites for economic growth, and not as competing policy objectives 
(Leubolt, 2013: 76). In doing so, his government not only changed the content of 
social policies, but also the very policy-making process. Lula’sFome 
Zero strategy takes a comprehensive approach to reducing hunger in 
Brazil. Fome Zero is an umbrella framework that includes programs aimed at 
increasing access to food, strengthening family agriculture, fostering income 
generating activities, and supporting partnership promotion and civil society 
mobilization. 
 This brief presents an analysis of the Fome Zero policy targeting family 
agriculture, the Food Purchase Program (Programa de Aquisicao de 
Alimentos, “PAA”). In Brazil 30% of rural enterprises are family farms. They 
produce 38% of the agricultural value and employ over 70% of rural workers 
(Rocha, 2009: 58). On the other hand, in 2003 rural poverty was as high as 41%. 
Accordingly, PAA seeks to tackle rural poverty and food insecurity by 
guaranteeing demand in local markets for small producers through local 
government purchases of agricultural products. The first section of this brief 
presents the context in which PAA was conceived, followed by a summary of the 
implementation process. The following section presents an evaluation of the 
policy results. Finally, the analysis concludes with lessons learned and proposed 
changes. 
 As previously mentioned, the PT election can be seen as the catalyst that 
propitiated the introduction of PAA. However, the formulation of social policies 
in Brazil started after the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1985. The 1988 
Brazilian Constitution set in motion the decentralization process that 
empowered municipalities. Then, the government of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (FHC) focused on strengthening democratic institutions and economic 
growth. In addition, in the early 1990s municipalities across different states 
devised conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes that benefited the poor. 
Moreover, during the FHC administration (1995-2002) the federal government 
launched CCTs at the national level (Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentacao). 
 The PT created a positive environment that enabled the formulation of Fome 
Zero, with elements that legitimized such social policies as PAA. First, with the 
transition to democracy social protection policies began to be seen as 
investments to further development and not as drainage of public resources. 
Second, the provision of social services had experienced a switch from a 
universalist model to one that prioritizes targeting vulnerable populations, i.e. 
CCTs. The third factor was the current economic growth, since the government 
would not have been able to establish redistributive programs without it. The 
fourth element was the country’s poor social indicators. Despite experiencing 
growth, Brazil had high social exclusion and inequality because the rapid 
economic development was elusive to the poor. Finally, the fifth source of 
legitimacy was the PT election. Lula based his presidential campaign on a 
discourse of inclusive growth. He promised to eradicate poverty and to 
redistribute wealth in the country, while reaffirming his commitment to 
continue with the orthodox liberal monetary policies introduced in previous 
administrations. 
 Rural poverty and food insecurity were the problems that drove the creation of 
the PAA policy. The PT designed the framework to address these issues 
through Fome Zero and the National Food and Nutritional Security Policy 
(“PNSAN”). However, it deliberately democratized and decentralized the policy 
debate. In a nutshell, Fome Zero is the articulation of a web of social protection 
policies and ministries and agencies and its, and PAA’s, success relied on 
creating partnerships with key stakeholders (local governments, businesses and 
civil society organizations). The federal government created the Social 
Development Ministry (“MDS”) to manage Fome Zero and its subsidiary 
policies. During the policy formulation process, the MDS organized meetings, 
workshops and symposia with a multiplicity of stakeholders. These encounters 
granted non-governmental organizations the possibility to exert influence in the 
policy process. Social movements also played a key role in the formulation of the 
National Law for Food and Nutrition Security (“LOSAN”). Furthermore, this law 
granted civil society participation through the newly created National Council 
for Food and Nutrition Security (“CONSEA”), which is present at the national, 
regional and local levels. 
 It was important that the new policy aimed at reducing rural poverty avoid 
compromising the pro-export production model that had transformed Brazil 
into one of the world’s largest food exporters. Policy-makers considered several 
traditional options, three of which were discarded for various reasons. An 
extensive agrarian reform redistributing land to the landless and small farmers 
would have reduced food outputs. A second alternative, to take no action, would 
assume that market forces would provide opportunities for poor peasants.  The 
third scenario was to formulate several policies, scattered across different 
ministries without coordination. The selected policy option implemented by the 
PT followed a multi-sectoral approach. It sought to increase poor families’ 
income through CCTs, (Bolsa Familia), aimed at feeding the vulnerable 
population via school meals, community kitchens and popular restaurants, and 
at strengthening family agriculture through credit and food purchase via 
PRONAF and PAA. Ultimately, this integral overarching policy focuses on 
guaranteeing food availability, improving food access and increasing food 
supply. 
 Successful implementation of such a policy demanded a new policy model that 
articulates the different dimensions of the policy, while also facilitating the 
participation of multiple stakeholders. In short, CONSEA, MDS and the Inter-
Ministerial Chamber on Food and Nutritional Security (“CAISAN”) established 
the policy system. In such policy system, the national, state and municipal 
executive powers have the ability to adapt the policy to their local context. The 
system is crafted after receiving feedback from within the political structure, as 
well as from the civil society. The following diagram illustrates how the food 
security policy process works. 
Created by Law 10.969 in 2003, PAA is administered by MDS and the Ministry 
of Agricultural Development (“MDA”).  PAA guidelines are defined by the Grupo 
Gestor (“Managing Group”), which is comprised of six ministries: MDS; MDA; 
Economy; Planning and Budgeting; Agriculture; and Education. The execution 
has two stages; first, at the national level in partnership with the National 
Supply Agency (CONAB), and second, decentralized execution involving the 
participation of state and municipal governments. These latter partnerships are 
crucial for PAA because the MDS and MDA budget are directed exclusively 
towards agricultural products procurement, while it is the local governments 
who ensure the system is operable to allow for the purchases. 
PAA includes four programs: Purchase for Immediate Donation, Incentives for 
Milk Consumption and Production, Direct Purchase and Stock Formation.  The 
first two programs aim at buying produce and milk to redistribute among the 
vulnerable population. Between 2003 and 2010 they represented 39% and 37% 
of PAA budget, respectively. The objectives of Direct Purchase and Stock 
formation are to facilitate resources for the promotion of public and individual’s 
stock formation that can guarantee food availability and fair prices for family 
farmers.   
PAA intends to benefit two groups of people: food producers and food 
consumers. The food producers are family farmers including fish farmers, 
fishermen, extractors, indigenous farmers, quilombolaand family farmers 
settled during the land reform. The food consumers group comprises people and 
families under social vulnerability, with imminent risk of nutritional and food 
insecurity, people assisted by national food and nutrition security programs, and 
children in public schools.  
The follow paragraph summarizes the main policy outputs. By the end of 2011 
the program had reached over 204,000 small farmers, which is only 3.28% of 
the rural farmer population. PAA’s target for 2013 is to buy products from 
445,000 farmers. PAA is present in 2,300 municipalities across the country and 
targets the country’s poorest regions. For instance, the Northeastern region 
receives 50% of PAA budget. In terms of resources, the MDS and MDA budget 
has risen from $52 million in 2003 to $585 million in 2013. In terms of food 
production, food purchases more than tripled between 2003 and 2010, from 
135,800 to 426,400 tons. On average, PAA serves 25,000 institutions that feed 
over 15 million people.  
PAA has produced both intended and unintended outcomes. First, the program 
has increased rural farmers’ income through food purchases. Now, local farmers 
produce and sell to local schools and hospitals. Moreover, PAA pays an extra 
30% above the regular price for organic products, boosting local economies as a 
result. Second, producers not covered by PAA are indirect beneficiaries because 
they also enjoy higher local prices. Third, food stocks have also helped control 
price fluctuations.  Fourth, there is greater diversity of products since PPA 
purchases more than 330 different items. Fifth, PAA has played an important 
role in the strengthening of associations and cooperatives. It also provides the 
stimulus to establish small agro-industries so that associations can process and 
add value to their production output.  
Two unintended outcomes attributable to PAA are an increase in price for some 
staple foods and the expansion of neo-patrimonial institutions, such as political 
corruption, patronage and clientelism at the local level. Thus, we can assume 
that the policy “winners” are MDS, CONAB, CONSEA, civil society 
organizations, farmers, vulnerable population benefited by PAA, local level 
authorities and local institutions (i.e. schools). On the other hand, three policy 
“losers” are those corporations in charge of selling food products to the 
government, farmers who cannot meet the PAA criteria, and low- and middle-
income urban populations who must pay higher prices. Although negatively 
impacted by PAA, these groups do not threaten the viability of the policy. 
Corporations and big businesses still sell food products to the government 
because PAA cannot meet the food demand. Despite the fact that they cannot 
sell to PAA, farmers have a suitable environment that provides easy access to 
credit and encourages production. Finally, even though prices increased, so did 
the salaries of the middle-income population. 
PAA is an innovative policy because of its participatory model during the 
formulation process, which allows it to enjoy support from its beneficiaries and 
civil society organizations. Also, PAA’s administration is notable since, given its 
multi-sectoral approach, six different ministries form the managing unit. 
Finally, the regular control and oversight done by social movements and the 
impending need to improve coordination among ministries make policy 
evaluation a necessary priority for PAA’s success.  
In a short amount of time, PAA has already undergone three evaluation rounds 
(2005, 2008 and 2010).  Each evaluation improves the policy and guarantees 
more popular support. For instance, after the last evaluation the government 
enacted Law 12.512/2011 and Decree 7.775/2012, which aims at facilitating 
coordination among the implementing bodies. It also raised the maximum 
farmer benefits from $1,250 in 2003, to $2,400 in 2006, to $4,100 in 2012. In 
addition, it encourages organic production by paying 30% above regular price. 
More importantly, the last policy redesign includes a gender component by 
establishing that at least 5% of PAA purchases must come from women’s 
associations. Finally, it guarantees a quota of 30% of institutional purchases 
(schools and hospitals, among others) for small farmers.  
However, despite the iterative evaluation and redesign process, there is still 
room for improvement in the policy. Most importantly, PAA does not reach the 
poorest of the poor. Although the registration process is very efficient because it 
is based on another social program (PRONAF), the poorest farmers lack land 
titles, thus cannot be part of PRONAF or PAA. The policy could be improved 
with provisions enabling the inclusion of this group.  
PAA is helping with the national goals of poverty alleviation, however redefining 
its goals and incorporating strategic planning in rural development could 
improve PAA. More specifically, PAA should reconsider its strategy towards 
associativism and cooperativism. The policy could enhance further rural 
development by supporting associations and cooperatives in becoming artisanal 
industries that add value to their products.   
In conclusion, PAA intends to solve a social problem by addressing both the 
supply and demand sides. On one hand, PPA’s objective is to eliminate hunger 
by guaranteeing food availability, improving food access and increasing food 
supply. On the other hand, PAA reduces rural poverty by providing 
opportunities to small farmers with market access and better prices. The policy 
has demonstrated positive results and has been constantly improved through 
iterative evaluations. With further strategic planning on how to help 
associations becoming the leaders of rural development the policy could achieve 
optimal positive impact.   
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